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FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW:
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON
Ilanah Fhima†
Fairness stands at the crossroads of copyright law. The concept
of fairness—which seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners
and users as well as the needs of the public in receiving information—
is present in the copyright exceptions in both the U.S. and the U.K. The
U.S. and U.K. adopt different approaches to how the defenses should
be structured, with the U.S. having an open list of which types of use
can benefit, leaving this for judges to develop in response to specific
fact patterns and changing conditions before them. On the other hand,
the U.K. has a list, pre-determined by British Parliament, of which uses
can benefit.
Both use the notion of fairness to moderate between different
interests at stake, and much of this piece is devoted to documenting
how the factors used to determine whether use is fair are in fact very
similar. However, it is argued that the open-versus-closed list
approach does make a big difference to the likely outcomes in the
jurisdictions—giving U.S. courts the license to privilege the type of use
over the countervailing interests of the copyright owner in a way that
is just not available to U.K. judges.

† Reader in Intellectual Property Law, Co-director, Institute of Brand and Innovation Law,
Faculty of Laws, University College London. Email: i.fhima@ucl.ac.uk.
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INTRODUCTION
Fairness stands at the crossroads of copyright law. The concept of
fairness—which seeks to balance the interests of copyright owners and
users as well as the needs of the public in receiving information—is
present in the copyright exceptions in both the U.S. and the U.K. The
U.S. and U.K. adopt different approaches to how the defenses should
be structured, with the U.S. having an open list of which types of use
can benefit, leaving this for judges to develop in response to specific
fact patterns and changing conditions before them. On the other hand,
the U.K. has a list, pre-determined by the British Parliament, of which
uses can benefit. Ultimately, all use the notion of fairness to moderate
between different interests at stake, and most of this piece is devoted
to documenting how the factors used to determine whether use is fair
are in fact very similar, and the evidence used to determine whether
1
they are made out is also very similar. However, it will be argued that
the open-versus-closed list approach does make a big difference to the
likely outcomes in the jurisdictions, by giving U.S. courts the license
to privilege the type of use over the countervailing interests of the
copyright owner in a way that is just not open to U.K. judges.
Consequently, judges in the U.K. pay more attention to the other factors

1. For a similar argument in the Canadian context, see Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing
Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canadian Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing
and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309 (2008).
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which, although largely common to the U.S., are applied more strictly
against second users of copyright works on the side of the Atlantic.
I.

OVERVIEW OF FAIR USE/DEALING

This section describes the structure of the fairness defenses in the
United States and the United Kingdom. It also explains some of the
external instruments that shape those defenses. Both jurisdictions have
defenses to trademark infringement, which allow third-party use of
2
copyright work deemed to be “fair.” However, the way in which these
defenses are structured differs such that one potentially leads to
differences in the substantive result when compared to the other.
A. The United States
The fair use defense in the United States is found in 17 U.S.C. §
107, which codifies prior jurisprudence on this issue. Section 107
reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A [the
infringement provisions], the fair use of a copyrighted work,
including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration
of all the above factors.3

2. It should be noted though that, additionally, all three jurisdictions have defenses for
discrete forms of desirable use, such as use by libraries or educational establishments, which are
subject to different conditions.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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The defense is commonly thought of as an “open” defense, in the
sense that it does not contain any limitation as to the type of use that
4
can benefit from the defense, as long as the use is “fair.” While a list
of typical situations where the defense might apply is provided, this is
illustrative only, and even when a use fits in to one of these categories,
it will still need to be shown that the use is “fair.” This determination
is guided by the list of factors given, though this list is not exhaustive.
The list does not prescribe the relative weight to be given to each of
these factors, although the courts have indicated their relative
importance in an evolving jurisprudence that will be discussed below.
B. The United Kingdom
The U.K. is often described as having a “closed list” of fairness5
type defenses. The mere fact that a third-party use is arguably fair does
not amount to a defense in the U.K. It must first be established that the
use is one of those listed in the Copyright Design and Patents Act 1988
6
(hereinafter “CDPA”). These are “research and private study,” ,
7
8
“criticism, review and news reporting,” “illustration for instruction,”
9
and the newly-added “caricature, parody or pastiche” and “quotation
10
exception.” Even if use is for one of the stated purposes, the third
party must then go on to show that the way in which he has used the
copyright work amounts to “fair dealing.” The terminology of “fair
11
dealing” has been present in U.K. copyright legislation since 1911.
Fair dealing is not defined in the CDPA and, as such, is left to judicial
12
interpretation, which in turn draws on pre-1988 jurisprudence. A
particularly influential definition which has been used as a starting
4. This approach is described in Emily Hudson, Implementing Fair Use in Copyright
Law: Lessons from Australia, 25 INTELL. PROP. J. 201, 211 (2013), although ultimately, she argues
against it.
5. See id. at 211. It should be noted that there are a large number of other defenses which
are included in the Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 31-76 (U.K.). These set out
specific conditions that apply to each of the different types of uses.
6. Id. at § 29(1).
7. Id. at § 30(1).
8. Id. at § 32.
9. Id. at § 30A.
10. Id. at § 30(1ZA).
11. Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (U.K.).
12. For an account of the development of fair dealing post-1911, see Jonathan Griffiths,
Preserving Judicial Freedom of Movement – Interpreting Fair Dealing in Copyright Law, 2
INTELL. PROP. Q. 164 (2000) and Alexandra Sims, Strangling Their Creation: the Courts'
Treatment of Fair Dealing in Copyright Law Since 1911, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 192 (2010). Looking
further back, see Melissa De Zwart, A Historical Analysis of the Birth of Fair Dealing and Fair
Use: Lessons for the Digital Age, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 60 (2007) and Alexandra Sims, Appellations
of Piracy: Fair Dealing’s Prehistory, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 3 (2011).
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point by many courts is found in Hubbard v. Vosper, where Lord
Denning noted:
It is impossible to define what is “fair dealing.” It must be a
question of degree. You must consider first the number and
extent of the quotations and extracts. Are they altogether too
many and too long to be fair? Then you must consider the use
made of them. If they are used as a basis for comment,
criticism or review, that may be fair dealing. If they are used
to convey the same information as the author, for a rival
purpose, that may be unfair. Next, you must consider the
proportions. To take long extracts and attach short comments
may be unfair. But, short extracts and long comments may be
13
fair. Other considerations may come to mind also.
Although ordered differently, it is possible to discern in this
statement the various factors mentioned in § 107. The type of use is
mentioned (as per the first U.S. factor), the amount taken is mentioned
(the third U.S. factor) and whether the use conveys the same
information as the author could be seen as a form of market harm (the
fourth U.S. factor). However, in this article, we will examine whether
the same relative weight is given to each factor in the two jurisdictions.
II. THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE
Significant elements of U.K. copyright law have fallen under the
harmonization regime of the European Union, and the exceptions to
copyright are no exception. Article 5 of the Information Society
14
Directive (hereinafter “the InfoSoc Directive”) requires Member
States to have certain exceptions. Outside of those exceptions, it
provides an exhaustive list of fifteen other instances in which Member
States can recognize defenses to copyright infringement in Article 5(3).
Those which are closest to the fair dealing defenses in the U.K. are:
(a) use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or
scientific research, as long as the source, including the
author's name, is indicated, unless this turns out to be
impossible and to the extent justified by the noncommercial purpose to be achieved;
...
13. Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (Eng.).
14. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001
on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16-17 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. There is a pending proposal
to adapt certain of these exceptions to meet the needs of the digital era. See Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single
Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016).

2017]

FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW

49

(c) reproduction by the press, communication to the public or
making available of published articles on current economic,
political or religious topics or of broadcast works or other
subject-matter of the same character, in cases where such use
is not expressly reserved, and as long as the source, including
the author’s name, is indicated, or use of works or other
subject-matter in connection with the reporting of current
events, to the extent justified by the informatory purpose and
as long as the source, including the author’s name, is
indicated, unless this turns out to be impossible;
(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review,
provided that they relate to a work or other subject-matter
which has already been lawfully made available to the public,
that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source,
including the author’s name, is indicated, and that their use is
in accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by
the specific purpose;
...
(k) use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche[.]15
Additionally, Article 5(5) requires that any copyright exemption
16
must be compliant with the three-step test, i.e., they “shall only be
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”
17
The CJEU, in interpreting these provisions in Infopaq has held
that the exceptions detailed in the InfoSoc Directive must be construed
narrowly, in accordance with the general European principle that a
provision of a directive which derogates from a general principle within
18
the directive must be interpreted narrowly. This has led to concerns
19
about the restrictiveness of post-InfoSoc-Directive user rights,
though others have argued that a careful reading reveals flexibilities in
how the considerable number of enumerated exceptions can be
20
applied. In the recent Deckmyn decision, the Court has suggested that

15. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(3).
16. The three-step test is discussed in more detail below.
17. Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-6569.
18. Id. at ¶ 56.
19. See, e.g., Jonathan Griffiths et al., The European Copyright Society’s “Opinion on the
Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckmyn,” 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 127, 129
(2015).
20. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of
Flexibilities (Amsterdam Law Sch. Research Paper No. 2012-39; Inst. for Info. Law Research
Paper No. 2012-33, 2012).
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it is willing to take an approach that involves a “balancing” of the
21
parties’ rights.
The relationship between U.K. copyright law in this area and the
InfoSoc Directive is a complex one. Key cases either predate or are
roughly contemporaneous with the entry into force of the Directive.
For the most part, it seems to have been assumed implicitly that the
U.K. defenses are compliant, and where they were not, legislative
amendments have been made. Moreover, at the judicial level, it is
argued that the cases described below display a relatively strict
approach to the defenses anyway, and the need to consider fair dealing
gives an entry-point for the considerations embodied in the three-step
test. However, in English and Wales Cricket Board Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd.
22
(“ECB v. Tixdaq”), Arnold J. has given a far more prominent and
direct role to the InfoSoc Directive and has suggested that domestic
authorities must be “treated with a degree of caution,” since they
largely pre-date the Directive and do not consider the three-step test.
III. THE THREE-STEP TEST
At a higher level, the outer limits of any fair dealing/use rule, is
the three-step test. The test, found in various international copyright
23
24
instruments, and the InfoSoc Directive, requires that all exceptions
to copyright be limited to (1) certain special cases; (2) which do not
conflict with the normal exploitation of a work; and (3) which do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. It has
been argued that an open-ended fair use defense does not comply with
the first step. In a stroke of irony, the Israeli transition from fair dealing
25
to open-ended fair use was challenged on this basis by the U.S.
26
However, the U.S. defense has not been challenged on this basis, and
as our discussion has shown, which the defense is in principle openended, the U.S. judiciary has construed the indicative guidance given
in § 107 in a way that recognizes the needs of copyright holders as well
as users. Thus, the Australian Law Reform Commission, in Copyright
and the Digital Economy, when considering the introduction of an
21. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13, 2014 E.C.J. 458 at [26]-[27], [34].
22. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.).
23. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2);
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), art. 13; WIPO
Copyright Treaty, art. 10; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 16(2).
24. InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(5).
25. See Meera Nair, Canada and Israel: Cultivating Fairness of Use 11-12 (Am. U.
Washington Co. of L. PIJIP Research, Paper No. 2012-04, 2012).
26. Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital Economy, Discussion
Paper No. 79 (2013) ¶ 4.147.
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open-ended fair use provision, came to the conclusion that there was
27
no conflict with the three-step test.
The three-step test has been brought more directly into play in the
28
U.K. by its inclusion in Article 5(5) of the InfoSoc Directive. It has
29
also been considered briefly by Arnold J. in ECB v. Tixdaq. The
general tenor of that decision is that fair dealing for the purposes of
reporting current events (the basis before the court) was consistent with
the test. It remains to be seen whether this decision heralds the
30
(arguably surprising) beginning of more frequent references to the
three-step test in determining whether a defendant’s use of another’s
copyright work was necessary. At the European level, Article 5(5) has
31
been interpreted by the CJEU in Infopaq as requiring a strict
interpretation of the copyright defenses, which would narrow the
situations in which it could be considered necessary to use another’s
work. However, Griffiths has suggested that the CJEU may be stepping
back from this approach at least in certain contexts with the
32
introduction of the concept of a “fair balance” in Deckmyn.
IV. THE FAIRNESS FACTORS
This section considers the key factors used in determining
whether use is “fair.”
A. The Purpose and Character of the Use
The purpose and character of the use is the first factor in the § 107
test. However, in the U.K., the statute limits the types of uses that can
33
benefit from the fair dealing defenses to “research and private study,”
34
“criticism, review and news reporting,” and the newly added
27. Id. at ¶¶ 4.138-4.149.
28. “The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be
applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or
other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”
InfoSoc Directive, supra note 14, at art. 5(5).
29. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [88]-[92] (Eng.).
30. Because of the general reluctance of courts to directly apply international instruments
in the normal course of events, see Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between International and
National Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 424-25, 430 (Malcolm Evans ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
4th ed. 2014).
31. Case C-5/08 Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. I-6569.
32. Jonathan Griffiths, Fair Dealing After Deckmyn—the United Kingdom’s Defense for
Caricature, Parody or Pastiche, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT (Megan Richardson & Sam Ricketson eds., Edward Elgar Publ’g
2017). See also Sabine Jacques, Are National Courts Required to Have an (Exceptional)
European Sense of Humour?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 134, 137 (2015).
33. Copyright, Design and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 29(1) (Eng.).
34. Id. at § 30(1).
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36

“caricature, parody or pastiche,” and “quotation.” Having a closed
list of defenses that can be justified by fair use places responsibility in
the hands of the legislator to pre-empt the kinds of uses which should
be permissible. This stands in contrast to the U.S. position, where the
types of use that can be fair have been left open and consequently have
been developed by the judges. It is hard to say which is the more
desirable approach—while the closed list can give a degree of
37
certainty, it can also stifle innovation and the development of new
technologies. Technologies which are not foreseen will not be included
in the closed list. The then-U.K. Prime Minister, David Cameron, on
announcing the Hargreaves Review, noted that the founders of Google
had stated that they could not have started their company in the U.K.
because:
our copyright system is not as friendly to this sort of
innovation as it is in the United States. Over there, they have
what are called “fair-use” provisions, which some people
believe gives companies more breathing space to create new
products and services.38
While this is, to a degree, speculation, it is certainly the case that
39
the Google Books litigation would never have got off the ground in
the U.K. because the use does not fall within any of the categories
40
listed. Ultimately, the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals decided
that the scanning of the entire text of copyright-protected books to
enable functionality for internet users to search for specific words or
snippets of text was a transformative use that augmented public
knowledge without providing substitutes for the copyright works and
41
so fitted within the fair use defense.

35. Id. at § 30A.
36. Id. at § 30(IZA).
37. But see Hudson, supra note 4, (arguing that the dichotomy of “closed list = rules =
certainty” versus “open list = standards = flexibility” may be overstated).
38. UK Copyright Laws to be Reviewed, Announces Cameron, BBC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2010),
http://bit.do/BBC_UK-Copyright-Laws.
39. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
40. Perhaps the closest analogy is The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd v. Meltwater
Holding BV [2011] EWCA (Civ) 890, [36]-[41] (Eng.), which involved “scraping” news websites
in order to communicate relevant articles to the commercial monitoring organization’s clients.
Just five paragraphs were devoted to fair dealing, in a treatment that The Chancellor himself
describes as “cursory”. Ultimately, the use was found to be neither criticism or review, nor news
reporting with no discussion of any potential benefits from such use of technology. A comparison
with England & Wales Cricket Board Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 (Eng.) is also
possible, since both are online platforms providing functionality in areas where the copyright
holder had not serviced the potential market.
41. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 202.
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Moreover, even if a technology or third-party use of a copyright
work is identified as socially desirable, it may take many years and
numerous legislative attempts for it to be allowed into the “closed list.”
The parody defense is a case in point: parodies can hardly be described
42
as new technologies,
and yet it took eight years from the
recommendation to introduce a parody defense in the Gowers Review
43
44
in 2006 to its actual entry in to force in 2014. By contrast, in the
U.S., the Supreme Court was able to class parody as fair use when faced
45
with the appropriate factual pattern in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.
The U.S. fair use provision leaves it to the judges to interpret
which types of use fall within the fair use defense. A number of
illustrative examples are given, which includes various types of use
subject to a fair dealing defense in the U.K. However, such uses are not
presumptively fair, and still need to be shown to satisfy the four fair
use factors to the satisfaction of the courts.
Instead, perhaps the greatest impact in recent years on the fair use
defense has been from the first factor, “the purpose and character of the
use.” In particular, judges have considered whether the use is
46
“transformative.” The language of transformative use is not found
either within the legislation or, indeed, the legislative history. Instead,
it owes its origins to an article written by Second Circuit U.S. Court of
47
Appeals Judge Pierre Leval, writing extra-judicially in 1990. He
argues:
42. Its origins have been traced back to ancient Greece. See Eileen Gredley & Spyros
Maniatis, Parody: A Fatal Attraction? Part 1: The Nature of Parody and its Treatment in
Copyright, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339 (1997).
43. ANDREW GOWERS, THE GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68 (Dec.
2006). A parody exception was again recommended in IAN HARGREAVES, DIGITAL
OPPORTUNITY: A REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GROWTH 51 (May 2011).
44. The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014
SI 2014/2356 (Eng.).
45. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Although it should be noted that
the question of whether parody was fair use was put to the Supreme Court in the 1950s in Benny
v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), the Court was split and did not reach a conclusion—
highlighting the risk of uncertainty that can arise from deciding such issues judicially—which can
ultimately also have a chilling effect. Moreover, this argument rests on the assumption that the
judiciary will be willing to take a flexible approach to expanding the reach of fair use. ROBERT
BURRELL & ALISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE DIGITAL IMPACT, 253-67 (2005).
Historically, the U.K. judiciary has repeatedly failed to exercise flexibilities open to them and has
instead narrowed the potential scope of the fairness defenses. Id.
46. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
715, 745 (2011) (explaining that once use is found to be transformative, then that determination
shapes a court’s analysis of the other factors).
47. See the account in Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms
Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 550 (2004). But see the discussion
of productive use in Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: the Productive Use Factor in Fair
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Factor One—The Purpose and Character of the Secondary
Use.
Factor One’s direction that we “consider[] …. the purpose and
character of the use” raises the question of justification. Does
the use fulfill the objective of copyright law to stimulate
creativity for public illumination? This question is vitally
important to the fair use inquiry, and lies at the heart of the
fair user’s case. Recent judicial opinions have not sufficiently
recognized
its
importance.
In analyzing a fair use defense, it is not sufficient simply to
conclude whether or not justification exists. The question
remains how powerful, or persuasive, is the justification,
because the court must weigh the strength of the secondary
user’s justification against factors favoring the copyright
owner. I believe the answer to the question of justification
turns primarily on whether, and to what extent, the challenged
use is transformative. The use must be productive and must
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a
different purpose from the original. A quotation of
copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes
the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s
words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the
original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value
to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material,
transformed in the creation of new information, new
aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very
type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for
48
the enrichment of society.
Judge Leval’s approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in
49
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, a case involving a parody of Roy Orbison’s
50
“Oh, Pretty Woman.” After noting that the wording of § 107 makes
it clear that what is needed is a case-by-case (and hence implicitly
judicially led) analysis, Justice Souter found that:

Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 702-22 (1994).
48. Pierre N. Leval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
50. While the original describes a pretty woman, in the defendants’ version, she is replaced
by a hairy woman and a bald-headed woman—both ladies of the night. In the words of Judge
Nelson, the later version “was clearly intended to ridicule the white-bread original” and “reminds
us that sexual congress with nameless streetwalkers is not necessarily the stuff of romance and is
not necessarily without its consequences. The singers (there are several) have the same thing on
their minds as did the lonely man with the nasal voice, but here there is no hint of wine and roses.”
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1442 (6th Cir. 1992) (Nelson, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice
Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersede[s]
the objects” of the original creation, Folsom v. Marsh, supra,
at 348; accord, Harper & Row, supra, 471 U.S., at 562
(“supplanting” the original), or instead adds something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other
words, whether and to what extent the new work is
“transformative.”51
This shifted the focus from where it had hitherto been, on the effect on
the market for the copyright work, to whether the secondary use created
a “new” work which was socially desirable. This though is a subjective
question, which implies a level of unpredictability, or “murkiness” as
52
Sag describes it. This may in turn have a chilling effect on the
development of new uses, given the uncertainty as to whether any
particular use will be found to be transformative. Scholars have argued
that it also privileges a particular kind of secondary use, which alters
the copyright work, potentially at the expense of uses which involve
“pure copyright” for a socially-beneficial purpose, such as
53
photocopying works for use in education. However, as has been
discussed above, the freedom in deciding which uses are
transformative does allow courts to be able to shield certain new
technologies from the reach of copyright as in the Google Books
54
litigation, or even to classify existing uses as socially beneficial and
55
transformative and hence within the defense.
Additionally, in some circumstances at least, U.S. courts have
taken a relatively liberal approach to what counts as transformative,
concentrating on the context of the use in order to find third-party use
which copies the entire original work without making any addition to
be transformative. This is particularly visible in the search engine
56
cases: in Perfect 10 v. Google, Google’s use of the entirety of the
copyright owner’s images, albeit in “thumbnail” size was found to be
transformative because “a search engine transforms the image into a
57
pointer directing a user to a source of information” and “a search
engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a
51. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citation omitted).
52. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 57 (2012).
53. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 550-53. See also the discussion in Dianne Zimmerman, The
More Things Change the Less They Seem “Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 251, 260-69 (1998).
54. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
55. As was the case in relation to parody in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music itself.
56. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
57. Id. at 1165.
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new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.” While there is no
doubt to the social utility of search engines, to class Google’s search
engine as a “work” seems artificial and it takes an esoteric state of mind
to consider the copyright images “transformed” in the way the court
describes, adding to the general uncertainty about the meaning of
59
60
transformative use. Similarly, in the Google Books litigation, the
entire text of the books in question were copied, but the fact that the
search engine allowed users to search for words in a specific work, or
61
across a corpus of books, and to view those words in context of the
text to determine whether the book was relevant to them, meant that
62
the use was transformative. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit did not
consider the arguably analogous creation of Napster to be a
63
transformative use, characterizing Napster as a “retransmission.”
Arguably though, the platform could be viewed as a form of search
engine for music. If one views these cases as situations in which
copyright has intervened with an effect on the ability of third parties to
develop novel technological platforms in fields that are not being fully
exploited by the copyright owner, a U.K. parallel might be seen in ECB
v. Tixdaq (which will be discussed further below), where it was found
that the defendant’s development of an app that allowed users to upload
eight-second clips was infringing and could not benefit from any of the
64
fair dealing defenses.
B. The Effect on the Market for the Copyright Work
The fact that the later use has or may have a negative impact on
the market for the copyright work has often been used to limit the
applicability of fair use/dealing. It is important to note at the outset that
there can be various reasons why the market is damaged: (i) the second
use may provide a direct substitute for the primary work; (ii) the second
use may damage demand for the primary mark through criticizing it,
e.g., a parody or critical review, and (iii) the second use may damage a
derivative or potential unexploited market connected to the primary
mark.
The difficulty with this factor is that by definition, use that is
critical of earlier work, or the ideas contained therein, will damage the
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
See Sag, supra note 52, at 57.
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d 202.
Id. at 216-17.
Id.
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2003).
Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.).
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market for it and yet this use and the damage caused will be necessary
to achieve the objective of the criticism. Arguably, the transformative
use consideration makes this balance better by focusing on the nature
and desirability of the second use, rather than the impact on the
copyright work. Inevitably though, considering transformative use will
implicate the impact on the market because a use which is a direct
substitute for the copyright work will not be transformative because it
has not added anything, but a use which had altered the original, albeit
in a commercially-harmful way, can be transformative. Impact on
licensing raises the vexed question of the extent to which creating a
work is one market that should automatically give the author/owner the
right to block innovations and uses in markets that it may not even have
thought of entering, but where the use of its copyright work is
necessary for the innovation to take place.
The fourth factor in § 107 is “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” In Harpers &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court stated that
65
this was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”
A year earlier the Supreme Court had explained the scope of the factor
against the context that the commercial benefit of copyright is what
66
incentives authors to produce, noting that:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work
requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that
if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual present
harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the
copyright holder with no defense against predictable damage.
Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that future harm will
result. What is necessary is a showing by a preponderance of
the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that
likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial
67
purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.
The importance of this factor in the U.S. has arguable reduced
considerably (particularly in relation to commercial uses) since the
68
increased emphasis on transformative use under the first factor.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose limits the
presumption that commercial use will be harmful to cases involving
65.
66.
(1984)).
67.
68.

Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
Id. at 546 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 6.5 (2016).
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“mere duplication.” However, harm to the market still forms part of
the test, even after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, and so it is worth noting
the breadth of the scope of harm that may contribute to a lack of
fairness, taking in actual harm and future harm, seemingly at a
relatively low level.
70
In Harpers & Row, former U.S. President Ford had entered into
an agreement with Harpers & Row and Reader’s Digest to publish, and
also to serialize, his memoirs for a substantial sum. The Nation had
managed to get ahold of an unpublished copy of the manuscript and
published a 2,250 word article, which included 300 words verbatim
from the original manuscript that included information regarding the
Watergate scandal. The Nation claimed a justification based on the
public interest in reporting current events, but this was rejected by the
Supreme Court, which instead focused on the fact that, as a
consequence of the publication of the “spoiler,” Time had cancelled its
contract with Ford, and the associated payment, meaning that there was
71
clear evidence of actual harm to the market.
There is an interesting parallel with the British Ashdown v. Daily
72
Telegraph case. The Daily Telegraph had managed to obtain and
publish a minute written by former leader of the Liberal Democrat
party, Paddy Ashdown, which showed that discussions had taken place
regarding a possible coalition between the Liberal Democrats and the
Labour party. The minute formed part of his diaries which, after
stepping down from the leadership, he had indicated he was
considering publishing, although he had taken no formal steps to do so
at the time of The Telegraph’s publication. After citing commentary by
73
Laddie, Prescott, and Vittoria saying that the most important factor
of the fair dealing analysis was whether the defendant was
commercially competing with the copyright owner by providing a
74
substitute for the probable purchase of an authorized copy, the Court
of Appeal found that:
the publication in the Sunday Telegraph destroyed a part of
the value of the memoirs which it had been Mr. Ashdown’s
intention to sell, and which he did, in fact, sell. Equally we are
in no doubt that the extensive quotations of Mr. Ashdown’s
own words added a flavor to the description of the events
69. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994).
70. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539.
71. Id. at 566-67.
72. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.).
73. HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS (Butterworths
Law 3d ed. 2000).
74. See Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [72].
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covered which made the article more attractive to read and
will have been of significant commercial value in enabling the
Sunday Telegraph to maintain, if not to enhance, the loyalty
75
of its readership.
This militated against fair dealing. What is striking in both cases is that
the courts have privileged the copyright owners’ commercial interests
over journalists’ perceptions regarding what is necessary to report
current events in a credible fashion. While it may be true that the
market for the memoir was damaged (although this was perhaps
doubtful in itself, as otherwise copyright owners would not enter into
serialization contracts) there is a latent assumption that there should be
a right for those who have held high office to make money in a
derivative memoir market by selectively releasing the “juicy” bits at a
time that suits them. This is particularly visible in Ashdown, given that
he had not even entered into a contract at the time and so suffered only
potential harm. This right, it seems, overrides the right of the public to
be informed about political activities in a credible fashion that, by using
the actual words of the politician, carries the least risk of
misinterpretation.
76
Perhaps a more clear-cut case is ECB v. Tixdaq. The defendant
marketed an app which allowed users to upload eight-second extracts
of sporting events, including the claimant’s cricket matches, to be
shared with the public online. While the English and Wales Cricket
Board (“ECB”) engaged in substantial licensing activity, it did not offer
at the time a standalone cricket clips service to members of the public.
Nevertheless, the defendant’s use conflicted with the potential for the
ECB to provide such a service in the future, and as such, complicated
with normal exploiting of the copyright work in a way that militated
77
against fair dealing.
In other cases though, the courts have taken a relatively robust
view of whether damage to the market, or the likelihood thereof, has
been proven. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Sony v. Betamax case involved
the question of whether the use of video recorders to record from
commercial television channels constituted fair use. As has been
described above, the Supreme Court was prepared to place significant
importance of the market harm factor. However, in this case it
75. Id. at [72].
76. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.).
77. Id. at [146]. Additionally, the ECB had licensing coverage of its matches to news
publications that offered their own highlights service, and so the defendant’s use put this licensing
activity at risk. Id. at [143]-[145]. See also Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater
Holding BV [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099 [64] (where the fact that the defendant’s use was
“commercial” counted against fair dealing).
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concluded such harm was not proven, given that audience
measurement technology was imprecise, and it was possible that
copyright holders would actually benefit from such time-shifting, as it
could enable a wider range of people to view the programs and
78
surrounding advertising.
79
Similarly, in the U.K. case of Fraser-Woodward Ltd v. BBC,
Mann J. recognized harm to the commercial value of the copyright
work as cognizable within the fair dealing analysis. However, in this
case, the harm that was alleged was not made out. The case concerned
the inclusion of Mr. Fraser’s photographs of the Beckham family in a
television program questioning whether Victoria Beckham was
manipulating the press, or vice versa. Mr. Fraser argued that if his
photographs were included in the program, the mass exposure would
“cripple” his ability to license them to newspapers. The judge appears
to accept that such loss of licensing opportunity could be relevant to
whether use is fair dealing, but he notes that “it does not follow that
80
any damage or any risk makes any use of the material unfair.” In this
case, the combination of the fact that Mr. Fraser had licensed others of
his photographs to television programs, the fact that the use of the
pictures was not “lingering” and that Mr. Fraser had not shown any
actual damage, or a significant level of risk thereof, meant that relevant
81
damage was not made out.
C. The Amount Taken from the Copyright Work
Perhaps the trickiest part of the fair use test, and ostensibly the
one that leaves the most discretion in the hands of users is the question
of how much of the copyright work that it is fair to take. Rightly, this
is a question that needs to be tackled on a case-by-case basis. This
inherently leads to a degree of vagueness, as it is neither possible nor
desirable for legislators or courts to preempt every instance of use in
82
advance in formulating a test. Thus, in Hubbard v. Vosper, Lord
Denning noted that “It is impossible to define what is ‘fair dealing.’ It
must be a question of degree. . . . [A]fter all is said and done, it must
be a matter of impression.” Similarly, (although admitted not just in
connection with this factor) the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the
legislative history behind § 107 “eschewed a rigid, bright-line approach

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452-54 (1984).
Fraser-Woodward Ltd. v. BBC [2005] EWHC (Ch) 472.
Id. at [64].
Id. at [63]-[64].
Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (Eng.).

2017]

FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW

61

83

to fair use.” It is argued that this flexibility should be used in a way
that gives a margin of appreciation to users. By the time this analysis
is taking place, it had been established that the use of the copyright
work is for a socially beneficial purpose. Thus, issues of freedom of
speech are at stake, and expecting users to exactly preempt judges’
views about the amount of the work that it is legitimate to take runs the
84
risk of chilling that speech. This is not to say that courts should pay
direct attention to human-rights-based arguments in every fair
use/dealing case (it is argued elsewhere that this is undesirable), but
rather that courts should bear in mind the context in which their
decision-making—under sections 29 and 30 of the CDPA and in 17
U.S.C. § 107—is taking place. As we will see below, this does not
always happen.
It is under this consideration that courts most directly need to
consider whether the use is “necessary,” in the sense that the legitimacy
of the form of use (e.g., news reporting, parody, etc.) has generally
already been established and so the question becomes whether the
extent of the copyright work used is necessary to achieve that purpose.
Again, this is a slippery question, with the risk being that judges
substitute their view of what is necessary for that of journalists,
creatives, etc., in a way that makes it difficult for the latter groups to
go about their legitimate activities with any degree of certainty about
how to avoid copyright infringement.
The dangers of an overly rigid approach to how much of the
copyright work can be taken for the taking can be fair can be seen
85
particularly clearly in the British Hyde Park v. Yelland and Ashdown
86
v. Telegraph cases, of which the facts of the latter have already been
described. In both, one of the important underlying questions was
whether it was necessary to use the original copyright works
(respectively, stills from the CCTV camera at Villa Windsor and Paddy
Ashdown’s minute) in order to communicate the information contained
therein. In Hyde Park v. Yelland, the Court of Appeal differed from the
first instance judge’s opinion that “it was close to necessary to publish
the photographs” to refute statements that Mr. Fayed’s father had made
elsewhere regarding the length of the stay and, more generally, that “a
picture says more than a thousand words” and so copying the stills was

83. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
84. See Jonathan Griffiths, Copyright Law After Ashdown—Time to Deal Fairly with the
Public, INTELL. PROP. Q. 240, 254 (2002).
85. Hyde Park Residence Ltd. v. David Yelland [2000] EWCA (Civ) 37 (Eng.).
86. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.).
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the most convincing way to prove how long the visit had lasted.
Instead, Aldous L.J. held that:
the extent of the use was excessive. The only part of the
driveway stills relevant to the alleged purpose was the
information as to the timing of arrival and departure. That
information could have been given in the articles by Mr.
Thompson [the newspaper reporter] stating that he had seen
the photographs which proved the Princess and Mr. Dodi
Fayed only stayed at the Villa Windsor for 28 minutes. If he
needed confirmation he could have relied upon the statement
by Mr. Cole [the PR director of Mohammed al Fayed’s
company, who had given the accurate times, though Mr. al
88
Fayed had subsequently publicized different timings].

In so doing, he was applying the test that he set out—that “the Court
must judge the fairness by the objective standard of whether a fair
minded and honest person would have dealt with the copyright work,
in the manner that The Sun [the defendant’s newspaper] did, for the
purpose of reporting the relevant current events.” The difficulty is that,
in reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal differed from the
journalist’s perception of what was necessary to make the story
convincing to readers, in the light of significant publicity of a
countervailing version of events. Clearly, this was not a straightforward
assessment, given that the first instance judge had also thought that the
89
use was necessary.
Similarly, in Ashdown v. Daily Telegraph, Lord Phillips M.R.
noted that “[a] substantial portion of the minute was copied and it is
reasonable to conclude, for the reasons given by the Vice-Chancellor
at paragraph 29, that the most important passages in the minute were
90
selected for publication” in finding a lack of fair dealing. This is a
somewhat odd point though, in that it would be hard to mount an
argument that the use was necessary if the unimportant passages were
included and a piece that did not include the “important passages”
would not be capable of achieving the objective of reporting current
events. Lord Phillips goes on to consider whether Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights mandates considerations
which go further than the conventional fair dealing test. It is here that
the court considers whether the use of the minute verbatim was
necessary. Interestingly, it found that it might have been in order to

87.
88.
89.
90.

See Hyde Park [2000] EWCA (Civ) 37 [17].
Id. at [40].
Id. at [17].
Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [76].
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prove that the newspaper had an authentic copy of the minute but that
the extent to which it was employed here was excessive because it was
“deliberately filleted in order to extract colourful passages that were
most likely to add flavour to the article and thus to appeal to the
readership of the newspaper” and “was for reasons that were essentially
journalistic in furtherance of the commercial interests of the Telegraph
91
Group.” Again, it is very tricky to draw a line between what is
journalistically necessary and what is commercially advantageous,
particularly as the two will often be in tandem. It is also a false
dichotomy since we can only have a free press if newspapers are given
92
the means to sell newspapers that attract the public.
What is striking about both cases is that the Court of Appeal’s
findings of the extent taken seems to have been infiltrated by alien
considerations. In Hyde Park, the Court seems to have been particularly
influenced by the fact that the taking of the copies of the stills were
unauthorized, while in Ashdown, the Court of Appeal repeatedly refers
to the fact that, even if the use was justified, the Sunday Telegraph
93
could have compensated Mr. Ashdown in order to make the use. With
respect, both seem to distract from the argument of whether it was
necessary to make the use. If the public was entitled to receive the
94
information alleging significant dishonesty in Hyde Park, this should
be the case regardless of how it was obtained. Likewise, compensation
in Ashdown is a hypothetical argument more suited to legislative
planning than an actual case, given that a license would have been
unlikely to have been granted ex ante and compensation ex post in the
form of damages following litigation would have an obvious chilling
effect.
A similarly restrictive approach can be seen in the field of news
reporting in Harpers & Row. The defendant had copied 300 words
describing the pardon of Richard Nixon from former U.S. President
Gerald Ford’s autobiography. The editor of the defendant magazine
justified the use of verbatim quotes “because simply reciting the
information could not adequately convey the ‘absolute certainty with
which [Ford] expressed himself,’ . . . or show that ‘this comes from

91. Id. at [79]-[82].
92. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13. Although there is a countervailing
question of whether any one copyright owner should need to be the entity that subsides this free
press.
93. See Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [68]-[69], [82].
94. On the right to receive information, see Robin E. Herr, The Right to Receive
Information Under Article 10 of the ECHR: An Investigation from a Copyright Perspective,
JURIDISKA FÖRENINGEN 193-211 (2011).
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President Ford,’ . . . or carry the ‘definitive quality’ of the original.”
This was used against him though, with the Court stating with implicit
disapproval: “In short, he quoted these passages precisely because they
96
qualitatively embodied Ford’s distinctive expression.” It is also
striking that in measuring the substantiality of what is taken under the
third factor, the Supreme Court expresses the figure as a percentage of
the defendant’s work, rather than as a percentage of the copyright
97
work. This approach seems flawed on the wording of § 107, which
calls for an analysis “in relation to the copyright work as a whole”98
and can be expected to have a particularly deleterious effect in relation
to journalistic articles which are, by their nature, short.
It is arguable that what drives both this case and Ashdown is the
prospect of commercial competition with the copyright work. Thus, the
length of what is taken is not particularly relevant, but rather what
matters is whether the defendant has taken the “juicy bits.” A similar
99
scenario can be seen in ECB, where the defendant ran a website
allowing members of the public to upload eight-second clips from
sporting events. Expressed as a percentage of a five-day Ashes cricket
100
match, eight seconds is infinitesimal.
However, it was significant
101
that it was the highlights of the match that were featured. Again, this
was against a background of the provision of a service that could
commercially compete with the copyright owner.
Other cases though have taken a more liberal approach to the
amount that can be taken for fairness purposes and appear to be guided
more by the later user’s perception of what is necessary to achieve the
purpose of criticism, review, or news reporting. Given that both Hyde
Park and Ashdown are Court of Appeal cases, it is perhaps of greatest
significance that the Court of Appeal took a less strict approach in Pro
102
Sieben.
The case involved a television program criticizing the
practice of “chequebook journalism,” including the treatment by the
press and publicists of Mandy Allwood, a lady who had become
pregnant with octuplets. The defendant’s television program included

95. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) (internal
citations omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 565-66.
98. Id. at 588.
99. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.).
100. Since there was no limit on how many of these extracts could be uploaded, it was
possible for the extracts to be “mosaicked” together to make something more quantitatively
substantial.
101. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [149].
102. Pro Sieben Media A.G. v. Carlton Television Ltd [2000] E.C.D.R. 110, 126.
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a thirty-second clip of Ms. Allwood and her partner visiting a toy shop
to purchase teddy bears, taken from a German television report which
was nine minutes long. The Court of Appeal seems to have found this
aspect of fair dealing relatively easy, finding that the extract was “quite
short.”103 Consequently, it was not held to compete with the original
copyright work under the guise of criticism.
A less strict approach is also evident in the somewhat older Court
of Appeal case Time Warner v. Channel Four. Channel Four intended
to broadcast a program about the film A Clockwork Orange, and in
particular, the decision of its director to withdraw it from circulation in
the U.K. The program contained clips that amounted to more than eight
percent of the original copyright film. While this was seen as
substantial, the Court of Appeal accepted the comment by Channel
Four’s commissioning editor for the arts that “serious criticism of a
104
film requires that you spend sufficient time showing the film itself,”
and so the length of the extracts did not prevent there from being fair
dealing.
The lower courts have also taken a more relaxed approach, guided
by what is necessary to achieve the defendant’s purpose. Thus, in
Fraser-Woodward, which focused inter alia on the relationship
between Victoria Beckham and the photographer Jason Fraser, Mann
J. acknowledged that, in including images of Fraser’s photographs, the
BBC program had taken the entirety of the copyright work. However,
this was not excessive because any criticism of a photograph is likely
to require the reproduction of the photograph. Instead, the judge
considered how long the photographs was featured for, finding that in
105
this case they were not “lingering.”
This sort of approach has
recently been put on a legislative basis in relation to quotations for
copyright works, where § 30(1)(A)(c) requires that “the extent of the
quotation is no more than is required by the specific purpose for which
it is used” for the defense to apply. It remains to be seen whether courts
will grant users a margin of appreciation in determining how much is
106
needed.
Likewise, in more recent U.S. cases, courts tend to take an
approach to how much can be taken fairly, based on what is necessary
to achieve the legitimate purpose behind the second use. In Campbell
103. Id.
104. Time Warner Ent. Co. v. Channel Four Television Corp. Plc. [1994] E.M.L.R. 1, 12.
105. Fraser-Woodward Ltd. v. BBC [2005] EWHC (Ch) 472 [64] (Eng.). In each case, it
was three seconds or less.
106. The use of the quotation must also be “fair dealing” under § 30(1ZA)(b). Thus, there
is potential for overlap considering the amount needed under fair dealing and under the specific
factor related to this. § 30(1ZA)(c).
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v. Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court explained that the amount that it is
necessary to take will depend on the character of the use under the first
factor and the fourth factor, since a piece that reproduces most of the
107
copyright work may be a market substitute. Here, the legitimate use
was parody. For that parody to work, it had to “conjure up” the original,
which necessitated “quotation of the original’s most distinctive or
memorable features, which the parodist can be sure the audience will
know.” Over and above that, it may also be permissible to take more to
achieve the objective of making a parody, but not so much that the
parody is a market substitute. In that case, while the parodist copied the
bass riff and first line, the rest of its version was composed of its own
lyrics and sounds and a different drum beat were added, meaning that
“no more than was necessary” was taken. There is a parallel to be
drawn here with the CJEU’s Deckmyn case, where the Court found that
“the concept of ‘parody’, within the meaning of [Article 5(3)(k) of
Directive 2001/29], is not subject to the conditions that the parody
should display an original character of its own, other than that of
displaying noticeable differences with respect to the original parodied
108
work.”
In some U.S. cases, it has also been recognized that reproducing
the entirety of the copyright work may be fair. This was the case in
Sony v. Betamax, though the justification offered for this was viewers
were just time-shifting what they had already anyway been invited to
109
view free of charge, meaning that the case is rather exceptional.
110
However, in more recent years, courts
have been willing to
recognize the reproduction of the entirety of copyright works as
necessary to facilitate the operation of search engines, which are highly
transformative. Consequently, the fact that the whole work was taken
did not weigh against fair use. The most prominent example of this is
the Google Books litigation, where the court noted:
not only is the copying of the totality of the original
reasonably appropriate to Google’s transformative purpose, it
107. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 587-89 (1994); Netanel, supra note 46,
at 745 (“Under the transformative use paradigm, factor three—the amount of the copyrighted
work that the defendant had used—becomes a question not of whether the defendant took what is
the most valuable part of the plaintiff’s work (as it was under the market-centered paradigm), but
rather whether the defendant used more than what was reasonable in the light of the expressive
purpose driving the transformative use.”).
108. Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13, 2014 E.C.R. 458.
109. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
110. See PATRY, supra note 68, § 5.2; Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright
Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 616 (2008) (arguing on the basis of his
statistical analysis that the courts have placed more emphasis on whether the “heart” of the work
has been taken, rather than on whether the entirety of the work has been lifted).
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is literally necessary to achieve that purpose. If Google copied
less than the totality of the originals, its search function could
not advise searchers reliably whether their searched term
111
appears in a book (or how many times).
The greater flexibility of the Court’s approach is also apparent from its
unwillingness to stop at the bald percentage figures of how much was
taken, noting that just as important is the order in which they are
revealed, as this will determine the extent to which the defendant’s
offering is a substitute. Thus, 16% of the text of a copyright work was
112
not considered presumptively unfair which seems rather inapposite
compared to the approach that might have been taken in the past.
D. Whether the Copyright Work has been Published
In order to implement the InfoSoc Directive, under § 30(1) of the
CDPA, the criticism and review defense is only available where the
work being critiqued has been “made available to the public” since
2003. There is no such statutory restriction in relation to news
113
114
reporting or parody. Nevertheless, in analyzing whether use is fair
dealing, for many years, judges have considered whether the work in
question has been published. Thus, in British Oxygen, a case dating
from 1925, Romer J. found that “it would be manifestly unfair that an
unpublished literary work should, without the consent of the author, be
the subject of public criticism, review or newspaper summary. Any
such dealing with an unpublished literary work would not, therefore, in
115
my opinion, be a ‘fair dealing’ with the work.” Requiring works to
be published to benefit from the defense seems particularly
undesirable, given that the fair dealing defense would be the first resort
for “whistleblowers” hoping to publish copyright information that the
authors would prefer to remain secret. It also allows authors to control
information by “cherry picking” what to release to the public. On the
other hand though, as an author, the thought of having endless “first
drafts” that have ultimately been reworked being publicly critiqued is

111. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphases added).
112. Id. at 223.
113. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30(2) (Eng.).
114. See id. § 30A(1), though a parody is unlikely to be effective unless the public are
already familiar with the source material.
115. British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Liquid Air Ltd. [1925] Ch 383 at 393 (Eng.). Somewhat
unconvincingly, Judge Romer argued that a publication requirement had been omitted from the
statutory fair dealing requirements because a dramatic or musical work would be performed in
public rather than published. See generally Sims, Strangling Their Creation, supra note 12, at
196.
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a disquieting one, particularly as discarded drafts may not accurately
reflect the views and standards of the author.
The overinclusiveness of the no unpublished works position was
116
recognized in Beloff v. Pressdram, where the judge doubted whether
Romer J. could have meant that unpublished work should be
“automatically” outside the fair dealing provisions, rather than an
117
“important factor.” Nevertheless, the basis of the decision that there
was no fair dealing in Beloff v. Pressdram, which involved a memo
from the political editor of the Observer newspaper to her editor
describing a discussion with a cabinet minister about the next prime
minister if the incumbent was run over by a bus, was that it was
118
“unpublished and indeed it was never intended to be published.”
More recently, the fact that the minute had not been published
contributed to the finding of no fair dealing in Ashdown v.
119
Telegraph.
It should be noted though that measures short of publication by
the author may remove the problem of the work being unpublished, if
the result is that the information contained therein becomes public
knowledge. Thus, in Hubbard v. Vosper, Lord Denning found that
while Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard’s writings had not formally
been published, the same effect may be present where a work has been
“circulated to such a wide circle that it is ‘fair dealing’ to criticize it
120
publicly in a newspaper, or elsewhere.” On the other hand, the fact
that the ideas as opposed to the expression are already in circulation
may mitigate against fair dealing. Thus, in Ashdown v. Telegraph, one
of the reasons why there was no fair dealing was much of the
information in the minute was already public, so there was not the same
121
need to use the memo itself.
In the background to this group of cases are arguably two
122
underlying concerns. First, the way in which the published works
116. Nora Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd. [1973] R.P.C. 765 at 786-78 (Eng.).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 787.
119. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.).
120. Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 94 (Eng.).
121. See Ashdown [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [74] (Eng.).
122. An analogous concern can be seen in Israel in the “Dead Sea Scroll” case, in which a
philologist who created intelligible text out of the fragments of the scrolls objected to the
publication of the text and argued that that was not fair use. C.A. 2790/93 Biblical Archaeology
Soc’y v. Elisha Qimron 54(3) PD 817 (2000) (Isr.) reprinted in Biblical Archaeology Soc’y v.
Elisha Qimron [2001] E.C.D.R. 6. The Supreme Court agreed, noting: “The appellants published
the deciphered text in its entirety, without mentioning Qimron's name, and by this they knowingly
infringed his right to be the first to publish the deciphered text”. As our discussions in relation to
market harm have shown, this will generally only be accepted where a strong countervailing

2017]

FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW

69

have reached the defendants often involves some form of suspect
activity, or even theft and dishonesty. This is difficult, because such
practices are often part and parcel of whistleblowing. Secondly, where
the reason that the work is unpublished is that the author has plans to
release it at a later date, this interferes with the copyright owner’s
ability to market his work.
In the U.S. too, lack of publication has historically played a
significant role in determining whether the use is fair. In Harper & Row
123
v. Nation, the Supreme Court found, by reference to the legislative
history of the 1976 Copyright Act that “the unpublished nature of a
work is “[a] key, though not necessarily determinative, factor“ tending
to negate a defense of fair use.” The Court identifies the potential
interests at stake as both privacy and the commercial interest of giving
the author the right to choose when he will publish. This implicates the
author’s persona interest in creative control, his property interest in
exploiting the work and the benefit to the public of enabling authors
the time to develop their ideas free from expropriation.
The decision was applied in Salinger v. Random House, a case
concerning a bibliography extracting letters written by J.D. Salinger
and donated to various university libraries. These letters were
considered to be unpublished and so, following Harper & Row, the
Court of Appeals found that the nature of the copyright work factor
weighed heavily in favor of the author. The Salinger court understood
Harper & Row to mean that “such [unpublished] works normally enjoy
124
complete protection against copying any protected expression.” The
impact of this decision was undone though by a legislative amendment
to § 107 in 1992, to add a statement that reads: “The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is
made upon consideration of all the above factors.” Thus, whether the
copyright work has been published remained a consideration, but not a
125
determinative one.
What is striking is that both the U.S. and the U.K. have both taken
a hardline approach to fairness in cases involving unpublished
126
works.
While the position in both jurisdictions has evolved from
interest is present. Id.
123. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
124. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
125. For examples of cases where this has been applied, see PATRY, supra note 68, at § 4.2.
See generally Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of Proof and the
Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1999).
126. Although, in the U.K., the unpublished nature often seems to have shut down the fair
dealing inquiry, while Beebe finds in the U.S. that while the unpublished nature was often
considered, it was outweighed by the other factors, and in fact what happened was that the fact
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effectively allowing no use of such works to allowing use, but only in
limited circumstances, it is still surprising that this factor has
effectively been allowed to trump the need for the user to access this
information to convey messages that are frequently in the public
interest. What is even more striking is that the courts tend, in their
decision making, to highlight the interests that would be put at risk by
allowing the use of unpublished works without considering the
countervailing interests of the public in receiving that information.
E. Whether the Author/Owner has been Acknowledged
A further way in which uses may be deemed not to be fair is if the
user fails to acknowledge the original copyright owner. In the U.K.
acknowledgement is a separate statutory requirement, rather than part
of the fairness analysis. Thus, fair dealing for the purposes of non127
128
commercial research,
for criticism and review,
“for illustration
129
130
for instruction,”
and “for reporting current events”
must be
accompanied by “sufficient acknowledgement,” unless this is
131
“impossible for reasons of practicality or otherwise.” However, no
acknowledgement is required for parodies, caricatures, or pastiches,
presumably in recognition of how parodies are usually presented to the
132
133
public
or for private study.
Sufficient acknowledgement is
defined as:
an acknowledgement identifying the work in question by its
title or other description, and identifying the author unless—
in the case of a published work, it is published anonymously;
in the case of an unpublished work, it is not possible for a
person to ascertain the identity of the author by reasonable
inquiry.134
In practice, the courts in the U.K. have been relatively liberal in their
construction of what counts as acknowledgement. Thus, in Pro Sieben,
the use of the logo of the TV channel that had conducted the interview

that the work was published weighed in favor of fair use. Beebe, supra note 110, at 612-15.
127. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, § 30 (Eng.)
128. Id. at § 30(1).
129. Id. at § 32(1)(c).
130. Id. at § 30(2).
131. Id. at §29(1B) (research); id. at § 30(1) (criticism and review); id. at § 30(3) (news
reporting, but only in relation to the use of sound recordings, films, and broadcasts).
132. Id. § 30A; see Griffiths, supra note 32, at 4.
133. Id. § 29(1C) (private study).
134. Id. at § 178.
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135

featured sufficed. The full name of the TV channel did not need to
be used, and the name did not need to be spoken. This was taken further
by Arnold J. in ECB v. Tixdaq, a case involving the uploading of a large
number of clips of cricket matches, who accepted in principle that if
the logo had been included in some of the clips from that day, a
reasonable user would appreciate that all the footage from that day
came from the same source, and so just including the logo on some of
136
the clips was sufficient acknowledgement. Likewise, in Newspaper
Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc, the name of the
newspaper, rather than the name of the publisher of the newspaper was
sufficient.137 A similarly relaxed approach can be seen in FraserWoodward, where Mann J. found that acknowledgement need not be
express:
All that is required is that it is an identification, though I think
that I can accept that it probably has to be one that can readily
be seen and not require some form of hunting around or
detective work . . . . It is probably not enough to say that the
author can be identified if you look hard enough; the
authorship must be more apparent than that.
...
I do not think that the concept of identification means that
there has to be a precisely or virtually contemporaneous act of
identification. Once the identification has been provided then
it is capable of operating in relation to a later appearance of
the copyright material.138
Thus, panning down to the author credits at the bottom of a photograph
139
sufficed.
Acknowledgement (or attribution as it is more likely to be known
across the Atlantic) has little formal role to play in the U.S. fairness
analysis. The concept of attribution comes with baggage in the U.S.
context, given its overlapping content with the moral right of
140
attribution. However, Cameron
points to a number of decisions
where attribution has been considered by the courts as part of the fair

135. Pro Sieben Media A.G. v. Carlton Television Ltd. [1999] WLR 605, 617.
136. Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 [53]-[72] (Eng.).
137. Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer Plc [2001] UKHL 38, [2003]
1 AC 551 (appeal taken from Eng.).
138. Fraser-Woodward Ltd. v. BBC [2005] EWHC (Ch) 472 [72], [75] (Eng.).
139. Id. at [73].
140. Catherine J. Cameron, Reinvigorating U.S. Copyright with Attribution: How Courts
Can Help Define the Fair Use Exception to Copyright by Considering the Economic Aspects of
Attribution, 2 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 130 (2013).
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use analysis. She cites a handful of cases: Rogers v. Koons; Karll v.
142
Curtis Publishing Co.;
Henry Holt & Co. v. Leggett & Myers
143
144
Tobacco Co.; and Feiner v. HR Industries.
145
Roger v. Koons
involved the creation of a wooden sculpture
based on a photograph of two people holding a number of puppies
while sitting on a bench. The defendant, artist Jeff Koons, found this
image on a postcard. His fair use argument was rejected in part because
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used the fact that he had torn the
copyright details off the notecard as evidence that the purpose and
character of his use under the first fact was the bad faith exploitation of
the copyright work for personal gain. Thus, lack of attribution militated
against fair use, although it should be remembered that this case
146
predates Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, and there is a good chance
that the artistic context may have resulted in this case being decided
differently today, given the transformative use doctrine. In Feiner v.
HR Industries, the lack of attribution of the photograph in question
could lead the public to think that it was in the public domain, reducing
147
the photograph’s ability to extract royalties.
On the other hand, the fact that attribution was present favored
fair use in Karll v. Curtis. The defendant, in an article about the Green
Bay Packers Football team, reproduced the copyright-protected team
song. Here, there was fair use in part because the author of the song
148
was acknowledged.
Yet another approach is evidence in Henry Holt v. Ligget &
149
Myers. The defendant copied an extract from an earlier copyright
scientific book in its pamphlet designed to demonstrate that cigarettes
are not harmful. The author of the book was identified in the pamphlet
by the defendant, and he argued that a link to such a commercial
context would be harmful to his reputation. Again, fair use was
rejected.
Although the argument is an intriguing one, it is hard to say that
this small number of cases over a fifty-year period and all saying
slightly different things constitutes compelling evidence of the
relevance of attribution in the U.S. context. Indeed, as Cameron herself
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 306-14 (2d Cir. 1992).
Karll v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
Henry Holt & Co. v. Leggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. Indus., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 308.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Richard Feiner & Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
Karll, 39 F. Supp. at 837.
Henry Holt & Co., 23 F. Supp. at 304.
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150

observes, the Supreme Court has never given a role to attribution, so
151
much so that in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose,
the Court observed that
defendants had attributed the original rights of “Oh, Pretty Woman”
but then failed to connect this to its fair use analysis.
F. Human Rights
Human rights can occasionally act as an adjunct to the fairness
defenses. Enforcing copyright means suppressing speech. While
freedom of speech is a human right protected by the European
152
153
Convention on Human Rights,
European
and common law
154
principles, and constitutionally-protected in the U.S.,
copyright is
also designed to stimulate speech and so an overly aggressive approach
to allowing third-party speech in this area runs the risk that the very
speech that we wish to share is dampened. It should also be
remembered that copyright is a form of property, and the enjoyment of
155
property is also protected as a human right.
Thus, human rightsbased references to freedom of speech tend only to be directly
determinative of when use is fair in exceptional cases.
It is sometimes argued that free speech cannot have a role to play
here because copyright only protects expression and others are free to
use the ideas communicated therein. Leaving aside the fuzziness of the
idea/expression dichotomy, it should be noted that free speech case law
holds that, on occasion at least, it is crucial that parties be able to use
exact words to make their point. The U.K. must heed the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in Fressoz v. France.
The issue there was whether Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights required that the journalists in question be allowed to
publish the tax return of a prominent French businessman. The Court
found that:
In essence, that Article leaves it for journalists to decide
whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to
ensure credibility. It protects journalists’ rights to divulge
information on issues of general interest provided that they
are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and
150. Cameron, supra note 140, at 142.
151. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573.
152. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
153. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 11, 2010 O.J. C 364/08.
[hereinafter European Charter of Rights].
154. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
155. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 152, at protocol 1, art. 1.;
European Charter of Rights, supra note 153, at art. 7; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with
the ethics of journalism.156
This suggests that journalists should be given a significant margin of
appreciation in determining whether it is necessary to use an original
document, or just the information contained therein. While the claim in
Fressoz was that the tax return had been published in breach of
confidence, rather than infringement of copyright, it has been
157
suggested that the same principle should apply where the proposed
interference with speech is from copyright. The discretion given under
Article 10 to journalists in choosing how to frame their articles and
which documents to include is not without limit though, as is apparent
158
from Bédat v. Switzerland.
There, the journalist had included
transcripts of police interviews with a man who had ploughed his car
into a number of pedestrians, and then attempted to drive off a bridge,
as well as statements from his wife, his doctor, and letters he wrote to
the judge. The journalist had then been prosecuted under a Swiss law
preventing the publication of secret official deliberations. The Court
reiterated the fact that Article 10 protects “not only the substance of the
ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are
conveyed” and that it was “not for this Court, or for the national courts
for that matter, to substitute their own views for those of the press as to
159
what reporting technique should be adopted by journalists.”
However, the ECHR found that this prosecution, while an interference
with speech, was necessary and proportionate given the sensationalist
160
way that the article was written, and the countervailing interests of
161
protecting the administration of justice
and the accused’s private
162
life. Thus, there are two reasons why the use of the expression was
not appropriate here: (i) the way it was used and (ii) the importance of
the countervailing right. It would be interesting to see the relative
weight the court would grant to the protection of copyright, which is
after all recognized as giving rise to a human right to the peaceful
enjoyment of property, but it is suggested that the outcome would be
closer to Fressoz than Bédat.
156. Fressoz v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 1 ¶ 54.
157. See, e.g., Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [78]-[83]
(Eng.). Interesting, the fact that the businessman’s tax return in Fressos had been obtained in
breach of professional duty did not affect the court’s willingness to allow the speech. This stands
in contrast to the position taken in the U.K. in Hyde Park and in Ashdown.
158. Bédat v. Switzerland, App. No. 56925/08, __ Eur. Ct. H.R. __ (2016).
159. Id. at ¶ 58.
160. Id. at ¶ 60.
161. Id. at ¶¶ 68-71.
162. Id. at ¶¶ 72-78.

2017]

FAIRNESS IN COPYRIGHT LAW

75

Analogously in the U.S., but outside the journalistic context, the
Supreme Court in Cohen v. California recognized that the First
Amendment protects expression, as well as ideas. Cohen’s crime was
his presence in the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a t-shirt
which said on it “FUCK THE DRAFT,” a reference to his views on the
Vietnam War. He was convicted of disturbing the peace, despite the
fact that he had not acted in any way violently. While Cohen could have
communicated his disapproval of the draft using other language, the
Supreme Court, in overturning his conviction noted:
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the
view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that
emotive function which practically speaking, may often be the
more important element of the overall message sought to be
163
communicated.
Nevertheless, even free speech advocates counsel caution on
overreliance on human rights arguments in the copyright context, given
that the law has an built-in balancing mechanism judged appropriate
by the legislator in the form of the fair use/dealing provisions. Thus,
according to Barendt:
[f]reedom of expression challenges to the enforcement of
copyright should only be sustained when copyright law is
used to suppress the dissemination of information of real
importance to the public or to stifle artistic creativity, parody
or satire. . . . The provision of “fair dealing” and other
defenses should not preclude an argument that copyright
enforcement infringes “freedom of speech” but a court can
properly require the infringer to provide strong reasons why it
should disregard the balance between the rights struck by the
164
legislation.
It should also be noted that overreliance on constitutional arguments is
in itself undesirable, and it is simpler for parties all around if the
concerns are worked into the legislatively-created balance between IPR
165
holders and users’ rights which are worked into the legislation.

163.
164.
165.

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 261 (2007).
See e.g., William McGeveran, Four Free Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1205, 1212 (2008).
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On the whole, this balancing happens.
However, on rare
occasions, the courts have been prepared to entertain human rights
arguments. These tend to be dealt with as an “add-on” argument to fair
dealing, rather than as part of the fair dealing balance. Thus, in
Ashdown, the Court of Appeal considered the impact of the Human
Rights Act after its normal fair dealing analysis, and ultimately decided
167
that both doctrines led to the same result.
168
In the U.S., the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft noted that
speech is generally adequately protected under copyright law: the
idea/expression dichotomy protects the communication of ideas and
fair use means that, in certain circumstances, the expression itself can
be used. Whether there really is a conflict between copyright and the
First Amendment of course depends on the assumption that the
boundaries of these doctrines are clear and appropriately drawn, though
it is worth noting that in recent years, the rise of transformative use,
together with the lessened importance of the market harm factor, means
that fair use has a greater scope. It should be noted though that some
scholars feel that the rise in transformative use has limited free speech
by privileging “rebels” at the expense for pure copying for socially
169
beneficial purposes, such as educational use.
CONCLUSION
Although it is clear that both the U.S. and the U.K. use similar
factors to determine whether the use of another’s copyright work is
“fair,” it is equally apparent that they place different weights on the
different factors. This is the case, even if each factor is examined in
isolation; the two jurisdictions have, at least in some point in time,
adopted a similar approach. This is particularly true in relation to harm
to the market, and in relation the amount of work taken, as well as prior
publication, where both jurisdictions historically have engaged in quite
similar analyses, and if anything, in the past, the U.S. has adopted a
stricter approach. However, it is argued that ultimately what has made
the biggest difference between the U.S. and U.K. approach is indeed
the closed-versus-open list. This is not so much because of the
structural difference between standards and rules. Rather, in the U.S.,
the open list has led to the development of the transformative use
166. See Griffiths, supra note 19, at 174 (describing free speech as “a background principle
which supports the fair dealing provisions”).
167. Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 [78]-[83]. See also HRH
Prince of Wales v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. [2008] Ch 57 [179].
168. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003).
169. Tushnet, supra note 47.
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doctrine under the first factor. This has “swamped” the other key
factors of market harm and necessity of use, which still play a key role
in the U.K. Once a use has been found to be so strongly in favor of the
public’s interest, it is difficult for the court to constrain it. On the other
hand, in the U.K., this discussion is predetermined by what is on the
“closed list,” leaving more room for a stricter approach to the other
factors. As has been mentioned above, there is an interesting contrast
170
171
between Authors Guild in the U.S. and ECB v. Tixdaq in the U.K.:
the finding of social value of Google Books’ services paved the way
for a finding that copying the entirety of the works was permissible,
while in ECB, the step-by-step analysis resulted in a finding that eightsecond clips were excessive and harmed a market that was yet to be
properly exploited. It seems that perhaps former Prime Minister David
172
Cameron was right after all . . .

170.
171.
172.

Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
Eng. & Wales Cricket Bd. Ltd. v. Tixdaq Ltd. [2016] EWHC (Ch) 575 (Eng.),
UK Copyright Laws to be Reviewed, Announces Cameron, supra note 38.

